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There has been a very rapid rise since the early 1990s in foreign reserves held by developing
countries. These reserves have climbed to almost 30 percent of developing countries' GDP and 8
months of imports. Assuming reasonable spreads between the yield on reserve assets and the cost
of foreign borrowing, the income loss to these countries amounts to close to 1 percent of GDP.
Conditional on existing levels of short-term foreign borrowing, this does not represent too steep a
price as an insurance premium against financial crises. But why developing countries have not tried
harder to reduce short-term foreign liabilities in order to achieve the same level of liquidity (thereby
paying a smaller cost in terms of reserve accumulation) remains an important puzzle.
Dani Rodrik















  Financial globalization has been accompanied by frequent and painful financial crises.  
Since the debt crisis of 1982, which engulfed practically all countries of Latin America, a new 
financial upheaval has erupted in some part of the developing—and occasionally industrial—
world with alarming regularity.  Some of the better known blowups include Mexico in 1995, 
East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Turkey in 1994 and 2001, Brazil in 1999, and Argentina in 
2002.  These crises have spawned a huge literature examining their causes.  And they have 
forced policy makers to look for protective strategies.         
  As Martin Feldstein (1999) concluded in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, 
developing countries cannot rely on the International Monetary Fund or reforms in the 
“international financial architecture” to protect themselves from such crises.  Nor, Feldstein 
reasoned, is it enough to rely on sound macroeconomic policies, since even well-managed 
countries can be hit by contagion from elsewhere.  The key, according to Feldstein was self-
protection through increased liquidity.  Countries with higher (net) levels of liquid foreign assets 
are better able to withstand panics in financial markets and sudden reversals in capital flows.  
Therefore they may not only reduce the costs of financial crises, they may also make such crises 
less likely.  Liquidity, in turn, could be achieved via three strategies: reducing short-term debt, 
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creating a collateralized credit facility, and increasing foreign exchange reserves of the Central 
Bank (Feldstein 1999). 
  Among the three strategies, raising foreign reserves is the one advice that developing 
countries have clearly taken to heart.  Foreign exchange reserves held by developing nations are 
today at an all time high, and stand at levels that are a multiple of those held by advanced 
countries (in relation to their incomes or trade).  But as Feldstein and others since have pointed 
out, accumulating reserves is also costly.  Central banks hold their foreign exchange reserves 
mostly in the form of low-yielding short-term U.S. Treasury (and other) securities.  Each dollar 
of reserves that a country invests in these assets comes at an opportunity cost that equals the cost 
of external borrowing for that economy (or alternatively, the social rate of return to investment in 
that economy).  The spread between the yield on liquid reserve assets and the external cost of 
funds—a difference of several percentage points in normal times—represents the social cost of 
self-insurance.  
  In this short paper, I document the rapid rise in foreign reserves held by developing 
countries and present some calculations on the social costs of these reserves.  I show that these 
costs now amount to around 1 percentage points of GDP annually for developing nations taken 
as a whole.   
I also discuss the optimality of current reserve policies.  There is convincing evidence 
that being liquid reduces the probability of suffering a financial crisis (and perhaps that it also 
reduces the cost of borrowing).  Given the high output and social costs of such crises, a plausible 
case can be made that prevailing liquidity levels are rational, despite their high cost.  Perhaps the 
insurance premium pays for itself.     3
However, this argument overlooks the point that liquidity can be achieved not just by 
building up foreign reserve assets, but also by reducing short-term debt liabilities.  A truly 
optimal response to the crises of the last two decades would have been to simultaneously 
increase reserves and reduce short-term liabilities.  As I will show, what is striking is that 
emerging nations have on the whole not reduced their exposure to short-term debt, even as they 
were amassing massive foreign reserves.  This behavior is difficult to reconcile with 
rationality—unless one is willing to ascribe benefits to short-term borrowing that are nowhere to 
be seen in the data.  Therefore, another way to think of the cost of reserves is that it constitutes 
the price tag—and a soaring one at that—for policy makers’ reluctance to rein in short-term 
external borrowing.   
One final comment by way of introduction.  It can be argued that the rapid rise in 
reserves in recent years has little to do with the self-insurance motive, but is instead related to 
policy makers’ desire to prevent the appreciation of their currencies and maintain the 
competitiveness of their tradable sectors.  The latter has clearly played a significant role in 
China’s reserve accumulation.  But as we shall see, reserve accumulation has not been limited to 
a few countries where export competitiveness is a particularly important policy objective.  The 
numbers look just as impressive with China excluded from the sample. Further, Aizenman and 
Woo (2005) provide some systematic evidence that suggests the self-insurance motive has been 
predominant as a driver of reserve accumulation. They contrast this view with the “mercantilist” 
argument that countries increase reserves in order to prevent the appreciation of their currencies.  
Their results suggest that the latter motive has been quantitatively much less significant in the 
recent build-up. Finally, it is worth pointing out that even when the underlying motive is one of 
competitiveness, reserve accumulation becomes the necessary consequence only when   4
governments are unable or unwilling to stem the tide of capital inflows.  Otherwise, governments 
could restrain capital inflows and prevent the appreciation of the currency more directly.  From 
this perspective too, there is a tradeoff between financial globalization and avoiding the cost of 
high levels of reserves.  Holding high reserves is the price to be paid for not managing the capital 
account more actively.         
 
II.  The Rapid Rise in Reserves 
Figure 1 shows the massive increase in developing countries’ foreign exchange reserves 
in recent years.  Reserves have risen from a range of 6-8 percent of GDP during the 1970s and 
1980s to almost 30 percent of GDP by 2004.  Reserves begin to trend sharply up just around 
1990, the year that is commonly identified with the onset of the era of financial globalization.  
Note that there is no similar jump in the reserves held by industrial countries, which have 
remained roughly steady at below 5 percent of GDP since the 1950s.  As the figure shows, the 
trend for developing countries looks identical regardless of whether China is included in the 
sample or not.  In other words, the increase in recent years cannot be attributed to China’s efforts 
to prevent the appreciation of the yuan.      
Prior to the era of financial globalization, countries held reserves mainly to manage 
foreign exchange demand and supply arising from current account transactions.  The traditional 
rule of thumb for Central Banks was that they should hold a quantity of foreign exchange 
reserves equivalent to three months of imports.  Therefore at least part of the increase in reserves 
may be due to the increased commercial openness of developing countries. But as Figure 2 
shows, the increase in reserves is equally evident when looked at in relation to imports.  Prior to 
1990, developing country reserves fluctuated between 3 and 4 months of imports. They now   5
stand at a record high of 8 months of imports.  Once again, there has been no corresponding 
increase in the industrial countries’ reserves-imports ratio, which still stands at less than 3 
months. 
It is pretty clear that the increase in developing country’s reserves is related to changes 
not in real quantities (such as imports or output) but in financial magnitudes.  Financial 
liberalization has led to an explosion in financial assets and liabilities since the 1980s, with 
which reserves have barely kept pace.  For example, Figure 3 shows the ratio of reserves to M2 
in a sample of emerging market economies.  The figure reveals that the increase in Central Bank 
reserves starting around 1990 has served simply to restore the reserves-M2 ratio to the levels that 
prevailed in the pre-liberalization period.  Moreover, this ratio has remained more or less flat 
since the early 1990s, indicating that reserves are barely keeping pace with the expansion of bank 
liabilities in these countries.  It seems clear therefore that developing countries began to 
accumulate reserves as a consequence of financial liberalization and globalization, and that they 
actually embarked on this path before it became part of the conventional policy wisdom.  
The policy guidance that the IMF provides to emerging nations on reserves was 
summarized by Stanley Fischer in 2001 in the following manner: 
An IMF staff study discussed by our Executive Board last year agreed that holding 
reserves equal to short-term debt was an appropriate starting point for a country with 
significant but uncertain access to capital markets. But it is only a starting point. 
Countries may need to hold reserves well in excess of this level, depending on a variety 
of factors: macro-economic fundamentals; the exchange rate regime; the quality of 
private risk management and financial sector supervision; and the size and currency 
composition of the external debt.   
  This analysis is now reflected in the way we treat reserve adequacy in our lending 
and surveillance activities.  (Fischer 2001) 
 
The rule that countries should hold liquid reserves equal to their foreign liabilities coming due 
within a year is also known as the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, after a principle enunciated by Pablo   6
Guidotti (then deputy finance minister of Argentina) and subsequently endorsed by Fed 
Chairman Alan Greenspan (see Greenspan 1999).  As Figure 4 shows, most emerging market 
economies had short-term debt/reserves ratios that were significantly above unity in the early 
1990s.  Since then, practically all of them have built up enough reserves to abide by the Guidotti-
Greenspan-IMF rule, most with some room to spare.  The only exception in 2004 was Argentina, 
a country that was just coming out of a severe financial crash.   
Finally, Figure 5 shows a geographical breakdown of reserve trends.  The surprise here is 
that the increase in reserves has not been restricted to “emerging markets.”  In fact, the increase 
in Africa’s reserves is as striking as that of Asia.  By 2004, Africa held reserves worth around 8 
months of imports, compared to 6 months in the Western hemisphere and close to 10 months in 
Asia.  So the reserve buildup is a phenomenon that affects the world’s poorest countries as well.  
 
III. Calculating the Cost of Reserve Holdings 
  Consider a country that lives by the Guidotti-Greenspan-IMF rule.  Suppose a domestic 
private firm or bank takes a short-term loan from abroad of $1 million.  The Central Bank now 
has to increase its reserves by an equivalent amount.  The usual strategy that the Central Bank 
will follow is (a) to purchase foreign currency in domestic financial markets to invest in U.S. 
government or other foreign short-term securities and (b) to sterilize the effects of its 
intervention on the money supply by selling domestic government bonds to the private sector.  
When all these transactions are completed, the domestic private sector ends up holding $1 
million of domestic government bonds balancing its foreign liability of $1 million, while the 
Central Bank has $1 million more in foreign assets and $1 million less in domestic government 
bonds.     7
Three consequences are noteworthy.  First, the application of the Guidotti-Greenspan-
IMF rule implies that, even when the process is initiated by borrowing from abroad, the home 
economy ends up with no net resource transfer from abroad.  The increase in the private sector’s 
foreign liability matches the increase in the Central Bank’s foreign assets.  Second, short-term 
borrowing abroad does not enhance the private sector’s overall capacity to invest.  This is 
because the private sector ends up holding additional government securities equal in magnitude 
to its borrowing abroad.  And third, aggregating the domestic private and public balance sheets, 
the net effect is that the economy has borrowed short term abroad (at the domestic private 
sector’s cost of foreign borrowing) and has invested the proceeds in short-term foreign assets. 
The last of these conclusions points directly to the appropriate way of thinking about the 
social cost of reserves.  For every $1 of reserve assets a country accumulates to abide by the 
Guidotti-Greenspan-IMF rule, the home economy pays a cost (an insurance premium, if you 
will) equal to the spread between the private sector’s cost of short-term borrowing abroad and 
the yield that the Central Bank earns on its liquid foreign assets.  This is the measure I will use 
here to compute the cost of holding reserves.   
Note that this measure is somewhat different from two other measures that often appear 
in the literature.  Perhaps the most commonly used cost concept is that of the fiscal cost of 
holding reserves.  Looked at it solely from the perspective of the public sector, the relevant 
spread is that between the interest on domestic government bonds and the yield on reserves 
(expressed in a common currency).  But any difference between the interest costs of domestic 
government bonds and short-term foreign borrowing is tantamount to a transfer from the public 
to the private sector in the domestic economy (or vice versa), and needs to be netted out when 
calculating the cost from a national standpoint.  Second, some studies presume that a dollar of   8
reserves could have been alternatively used to augment the public capital stock of the economy, 
and use the social opportunity cost of (public) capital as the relevant benchmark in lieu of the 
cost of foreign borrowing.  But the social opportunity cost of capital is a slippery concept that is 
hard to implement empirically (see Hauner 2005).  In any case, the process of accumulating 
reserves, as sketched above, makes clear that the relevant counterfactual in most instances is not 
one additional dollar of public investment, but one less dollar of short-term foreign debt.   
In contrast to established practice in the literature, I also exclude the component of 
reserves that is held for traditional, current-account financing purposes.  Assuming that the three-
months of imports rule captures the traditional component, I will compute the cost of holding 
reserves in excess of the amount that is required to satisfy the three-months rule.  As we saw 
previously, this is consistent with the actual practice of central banks.  Prior to the 1990s, 
reserves hovered around the 3-4 months mark, and began their sharp climb thereafter.  This will 
give us a more realistic estimate of the costs imposed by financial globalization per se.  
We also need estimates of the spread between private foreign borrowing costs and yields 
on reserve assets.  While one can approximate the yields on foreign reserves by looking at short-
term U.S. Treasury securities and other short-term assets, there is no direct source of information 
on costs of short-term borrowing.  Unlike sovereign bonds, which are traded and for which we 
have the EMBI and other benchmarks, most short-term private borrowing takes the form of 
commercial bank lending at rates which are not publicly available.  Some indirect guidance can 
be obtained by looking at EMBI spreads, which have averaged around 700 basis points since the 
early 1990s, with lots of ups and occasional downs (see Kamin 2002).  These spreads might 
overstate the spread we are interested in to the extent that some of the private short-term debt   9
takes the form of trade credit at relatively low interest rates.  But they understate it to the extent 
that private entities in developing countries face a higher cost of borrowing than sovereigns.   
I present three sets of calculations, based on spread levels of 3 percent, 5 percent, and 7 
percent.  The results are shown in Table 6.  Since “excess” reserves have risen very rapidly since 
1990, the estimated social costs also show a very steep increase.  Using the mid-point of our 
range of spreads (5 percentage points), the cost of excess reserves now stands at close to 1 
percent of developing countries’ GDP.  This is a large number by any standard.  It is a multiple 
of the budgetary cost of even the most aggressive anti-poverty programs implemented in 
developing countries.
2  And it is roughly the same order of magnitude as the projected gains for 
developing nations from a successful conclusion of the Doha round of trade negotiations (see for 
example Anderson and Martin, 2005).  Developing nations are paying a very high price to play 
by the rules of financial globalization.   
 
IV.  The Optimality of Reserve Policies 
             Of course, the high cost of reserve holdings does not necessarily imply that developing 
nations are being irrational.  The greater liquidity that reserves provide presumably reduces the 
likelihood of financial crises, and may also reduce the cost of foreign borrowing in normal times.  
In fact, conditional on short-term external debt levels being what they are, it is easy to make the 
case that developing country reserve levels are not excessive in general.  
  To see this, consider the following back-of-the envelope calculation.  We know from a 
range of empirical studies that countries with higher reserves/short-term debt ratios are less 
prone to financial crashes.  For example, in Rodrik and Velasco (2000) we estimated that a 
country that abides by the Guidotti-Greenspan-IMF rule of holding reserves equal to at least its 
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short-term debt reduces the (annual) probability of experiencing a sharp reversal in capital flows 
by 10 percentage points on average.  Further, suppose that the output cost of a financial crisis is 
of the order of 10 percentage points of GDP, which is not too far from what is estimated in, for 
example, Hutchison and Noy (2002).  Hence, in expected value terms the benefits of the 
Guidotti-Greenspan-IMF rule amount to about 1 percentage points of GDP (0.10 x 0.10). Under 
these assumptions, a risk-averse government ought to be willing to invest more than 1 percentage 
points of GDP in order to meet the Guidotti-Greenspan-IMF requirement.  In other words, 
prevailing patterns of reserve holdings are far from crazy in view of the significant costs of being 
less liquid. Similar results have been obtained using more detailed optimization frameworks in     
Garcia and Soto (2004) and Jeanne and Ranciere (2005).
3 
  Such calculations overlook a significant point, however.  They essentially assume that 
liquidity can be raised only by increasing reserve holdings.  Obviously, liquidity is a relative 
concept that takes into account the level of liquid assets in relation to liquid liabilities.  The 
Guidotti-Greenspan-IMF rule refers to the ratio of reserves to foreign liabilities falling due 
within a year, while the empirical literature typically employs the ratio of reserves to short-term 
external debt.  Therefore, an optimal strategy of increasing liquidity would combine reserve 
accumulation with reduced short-term debt exposure--unless for some reason reducing short-
term foreign liabilities is exceptionally costly (more so than building up reserves). 
  Yet the striking fact is that short-term debt exposure has continued to climb in many 
countries, even as these same countries were investing valuable resources in increasing reserve 
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assets.  As Figure 7 shows, half of the emerging market economies had higher short-term debt-
GDP ratios in 2004 than they did in 1990.  In contrast, none held lower reserves in relation to 
GDP.  Looking at the group of emerging market economies in aggregate, the average short-term 
debt-GDP ratio has risen from 5.4 (6.5) percent to 6.1 (8.4) percent in weighted (unweighted) 
terms between 1990 and 2004, while the reserves-GDP and reserves-short-term debt ratios have 
increased by a multiple (Table 1).  The minimum that can be said is that there has not been a 
clear downward trend in short-term debt exposure, a fact that looks all the more astonishing 
when we put it together with the massive boost in reserves.     
Could it be that the reason for these trends is the large cost of reducing short-term debt 
levels?  The experience of Chile in the 1990s (as well as many others with less transparent 
policies) shows that governments are able to influence the maturity of their debt profile when 
they put their mind to it.  Perhaps short-term foreign debt has large benefits which dissuade 
governments from taking measures to restrain its buildup.  But if this is the case, it is not at all 
clear what those benefits are.  In principle, larger debt could provide for improved risk sharing, 
better financial intermediation, and greater domestic investment, but I am not aware of any 
empirical studies that have been able to document such effects in emerging market economies, 
least of all for short-term borrowing.  True, short-term borrowing is usually cheaper in financial 
terms, but that is only because it transfers greater risk to the borrowers (see for example Broker 
et al. 2004, Velasco and Rodrik 2000).  Certainly gross fixed capital formation has not been 
visibly affected by the vast pool of short-term flows moving into emerging market economies 
(Figure 8).  In the apt words of Joshua Aizenman (2005, 959), “the 1990s’ experience with 
financial liberalization suggests that the gains from external financing are overrated.” 
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V.  Concluding Remarks 
An implication of this analysis is that developing countries have responded to financial 
globalization in a highly unbalanced and far from optimal manner.  They have over-invested in 
the costly strategy of reserve accumulation and under-invested in capital-account management 
policies to reduce their short-term foreign liabilities.  In reality, of course, the Guidotti-
Greenspan-IMF rule is an admonishment that applies as much to short-term foreign borrowing as 
it does to reserves. 
The reason for this suboptimal response is unclear.  Perhaps it has to do with the fact that, 
unlike reserve accumulation, controls on short-term borrowing hurt powerful financial interests, 
both at home and abroad.  International financial institutions have done very little work on 
capital-account management techniques and have not advocated them.  Consequently, “market 
intervention” in the form of taxing short-term capital inflows has developed an unsavory 
reputation that “market intervention” in the form of buying reserves does not have.   
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Developing Countries (excl. China)
 
 
Source:  IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS). Figure 2 
Foreign reserves (excluding gold)





























































































































Developing Countries (excl. China)
 
Source: Calculated from IMF, IFS. Figure 3 




















































































































































* Excluding former socialist economies, China, and Taiwan
 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI). Figure 4 














Sources:  Short-term debt statistics are from the Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank Statistics on External Debt Online Database. Figure 5 





























































































































Source:  IMF, IFS.   Figure 6 















Sources:  Author’s calculations. Figure 7 














Sources:  Short-term debt statistics are from the Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank Statistics on External Debt Online Database. 
Table 1 
 
Short-term debt and reserves ratios, 
all EMs 
  1990 2004
STD-Reserves    
weighted avg  1.11  0.27
unweighted avg  1.93  0.56
    
STD-GDP    
weighted avg  5.4%  6.1%
unweighted avg  6.5%  8.4%
    
Reserves-GDP    
weighted avg  4.8%  22.5%
unweighted avg  3.4%  15.0%
        
Note: EMs included are those in Fig. 7 Figure 8 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)





















































































































































Sources:  World Bank, WDI. 